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Abstract: This article addresses the question whether Whiteheadians should 
be vegetarians in two ways. First, I question whether Whitehead should have 
been a vegetarian to be consistent, arguing that his omnivorous diet was 
inconsistent with his own philosophy. Second, I evaluate the works of three 
distinguished Whiteheadian philosophers on the ethics of vegetarianism. I 
argue that Charles Birch, John Cobb, and Jay McDaniel have prioritised 
animals justifiably over other organisms, yet that Birch and Cobb fail to do 
justice to the lives of other animals, and that the account provided by 
McDaniel fails to provide a convincing argument for minimal moral 
vegetarianism.  
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Should Whiteheadians Be Vegetarians? A Critical Analysis of the 
Thoughts of Whitehead, Birch, Cobb, and McDaniel 
 
Introduction 
A number of thinkers have been inspired by the philosophy of the English 
philosopher Alfred Whitehead (1861-1947) to develop their ideas about 
environmental and animal ethics. The issue I am concerned with here is the 
moral basis of vegetarianism. The aim of this article is to explore and critically 
evaluate the views of Whitehead and three distinguished Whiteheadian 
scholars who have written on the ethics of vegetarianism. I start by examining 
Whitehead’s views on this issue.   
 
Was Whitehead a vegetarian? 
Whitehead did not accept reductionist materialism. This is the view that reality 
is a collection of objects that are unable to change themselves, that are 
determined entirely by external forces. Neither did he agree to dualism, or the 
view that reality is constituted by two distinctly different categories of things, 
namely purely material objects and purely mental subjects. Opposing both 
ontologies, Whitehead conceived of reality as a collection of organisms. This 
way of thinking about reality has now become known as process thought or 
the philosophy of organism. The names that Whitehead (1978, p. 18) used to 
describe these organisms are ‘actual occasions’, ‘actual entities’, and ‘drops 
of experience’. He used the word ‘actual’ to emphasise the ever-changing 
nature of the process of reality, in accordance with his view that, rather than 
endure, entities pop into existence and pass away in the blink of an eye. The 
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things which we perceive as enduring (e.g. a human person) are in reality 
spatio-temporal societies of actual entities. Whitehead thought that there are 
two basic ways in which these societies could be organised. Either they would 
be ‘democracies’ or aggregates, if they lacked a dominant occasion exerting 
central control over the subordinate actual occasions (e.g., stones), or they 
would be ‘societies with regnant occasions’. For example, a human being is a 
society with a presiding or regnant occasion, the human mind, which exerts 
some central control over the whole human organism (Whitehead, 1978, p. 
99-109).1 He also thought that each presently existing actual entity is 
determined, to some degree, by past actual entities in what he called that 
entity’s ‘prehension’ (‘taking account of’ or ‘feeling’), and each present actual 
entity is itself, by virtue of its own creativity, determining, to some degree, the 
feelings of future actual entities. In this way, each actual entity is internally 
related to its past (because the past can influence the present) and externally 
related to its future (because the future cannot influence the present). He 
referred to the determined aspect as the actual entity’s physical pole and to 
the determining aspect as its mental pole. Although Whitehead thought that 
the relative strengths of these poles may vary significantly when different 
actual entities are compared, both poles would nevertheless be present in all 
of them: ‘The most complete concrete fact is dipolar, physical and mental. But 
… the proportion of importance, as shared between the two poles, may vary 
from negligibility to dominance of either pole’ (Whitehead, 1930, p. 104-105). 
Pete Gunter (2000, p. 214) has summarised this worldview as one wherein all 
‘happenings are suffused with mind: that is, with some level of awareness, 
however vague or flickering’. Indeed, Whitehead thought that different 
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organisms possess different grades or intensities of experience. Although he 
placed human experiences at the top, he also distinguished ‘higher animals’, 
providing the example of birds, from ‘lower forms of animal life’, providing the 
examples of insects (which would have ‘some central control’), worms, and 
jellyfish (which would be ‘very little centralized’), as well as from vegetation 
(Whitehead, 1978, p. 107-108; Whitehead, 1938, p. 3-4).  
 Although Whitehead (1938, p. 4) hardly addressed the question of 
what the moral relevance might be of his view that there are different grades 
of organisms, at one point he wrote that ‘the higher animals … rightly claim 
our love and tenderness’. It must be asked whether this view can be 
consistent with the likelihood that Whitehead neither abstained from eating 
‘higher animals’ nor committed himself to vegetarianism at any stage of his 
life.2 One particular paragraph in his work raises doubt as to whether 
Whitehead was consistent with his philosophy, given that he did not commit 
himself to vegetarianism. The relevant paragraph is found in his ‘Process and 
Reality’, where Whitehead makes a few remarks that bear on food ethics. 
After writing that living organisms are dissolved ‘into somewhat simpler social 
elements’ when they are eaten, Whitehead (1978, p. 105) proceeds with the 
idea that that which is used as food is ‘robbed of something’. I presume that 
what Whitehead meant here is that living organisms die when they are used 
as food by other organisms, a process whereby more complex organisms are 
reduced to the simpler organisms out of which they are composed. Whitehead 
(1978, p. 105) then proceeds by writing that this is where ‘morals become 
acute’ because ‘the robber requires justification’. Unless all forms of eating 
require a justification - an unlikely interpretation given that life would not be 
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possible without eating - this remark only makes sense provided a distinction 
can be made (under particular circumstances) between two categories of 
organisms, those that one can justifiably eat and those that one ought not eat. 
Although Whitehead did not state explicitly which categories he had in mind, 
he wrote: ‘The living society may, or may not, be a higher type of organism 
than the food which it disintegrates’ (Whitehead, 1978, p. 105). The example 
that Whitehead provided of such a living society is an animal.  
 To put things simply: Whitehead (1978, p. 108; 1933, p. 264) 
recognised that there are animals who eat other animals as well as animals 
who eat plants (and animals who eat both), in accordance with his view that 
most animals are higher organisms with presiding occasions compared to 
plants, which he thought of as democracies (Whitehead, 1978, p. 107; 
Whitehead, 1933, p. 264). The fact that Whitehead talks about ‘morals’ in this 
context indicates that he thought that the choice of what to eat becomes a 
moral issue when the feeding living society happens to be a moral agent. This 
suggests that Whitehead thought that, given the existence of a moral choice 
(under a given set of helpful circumstances) between eating what he 
considered to be relatively high organisms and eating relatively low 
organisms, preference must be given to the latter, at least in situations where 
eating the higher organisms would be preceded by their destruction for that 
purpose. This follows from the fact that it is hard to see why anyone would 
require a ‘justification’ if the choice of what to eat would not matter morally. 
Although Whitehead may have considered many other moral issues in relation 
to food choice, what is clear from this paragraph is that his line of thought 
would have committed Whitehead to a vegetarian diet, at least if we can 
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assume that adequate alternative foodstuffs were available to him at 
acceptable ecological and social costs and that consuming animals who had 
not been killed in order to be eaten (e.g., the victims who are killed by human 
traffic) would not have been a serious practical option in Whitehead’s time. So 
we can only speculate as to why Whitehead chose not to adopt such a diet.  
 
Whiteheadian developments 
A number of process thinkers have contributed to the growing field of animal 
ethics. Here I engage with the works of three renowned Whiteheadian 
scholars, Charles Birch, John Cobb, and Jay McDaniel, to address whether 
they share Whitehead’s belief that people should, where possible, be 
vegetarians and to explore whether their views on this issue survive ethical 
scrutiny. Two questions are crucial in this inquiry. First, should animals be 
granted greater moral significance than plants, and if so, on what basis? 
Second, should humans who can have adequate and secure diets without 
unacceptably high social or ecological costs have a prima facie duty merely to 
refrain from inflicting pain upon animals, or should they also grant them a 
prima facie right to life? If we have only the former obligation, some might 
claim that it would still be possible to kill animals painlessly, and that there is 
no reason why we should not do so. If we have the latter obligation, however, 
a case could be made for what I define as ‘minimal moral vegetarianism’. This 
position holds that the consumption of animals should be allowed only if either 
of two conditions applies. The first condition is that no adequate and secure 
alternative foodstuffs could be made available without unacceptably high 
ecological or social costs. The second is that only animals who are killed 
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accidentally, or  who die naturally, or animals who are killed for the 
satisfaction of their interests (so-called mercy killings) are eaten.3 
 
Should plants be granted less moral significance? 
With regard to the first question, most process thinkers hold the view that 
plants should be given less moral significance than animals. Jay McDaniel 
(1989, p. 69), for example, argues that ‘a plant cell’s aim to survive – much 
less to survive with satisfaction – does not seem to be as great as that of a 
porpoise’s interest in surviving with satisfaction’, and that therefore 
‘instrumental considerations being equal, it is more problematic to take the life 
of a porpoise than a simple plant’. 
 A first assumption McDaniel (1989, p. 78) shares with Whitehead 
is that a plant is what Whitehead (1933, p. 264) called a ‘democracy’, which is 
why McDaniel speaks of a ‘plant cell’s aim’ rather than a plant’s aim as a 
whole. McDaniel doubts that most plants have a presiding occasion, a point 
that seems obvious in light of the fact that plants lack some sort of brain that 
many animals have. However, this could be questioned. Because plants are 
integrated systems with specialised parts (stem, leaves, roots, etc.), it is 
plausible that they possess a dominant center of activity that presides over all 
subordinate centers of activity (or ‘occasions’), in ways similar to the ways in 
which many animals can exert some degree of central control. Therefore, not 
only the cells that compose it but also the plant as a whole may possess an 
‘aim to survive’.  In fairness, McDaniel (1989, p. 79) concedes that this might 
be the case for some plants where he claims that ‘more complex plants such 
as angiosperms’ may ‘have the beginnings of a psyche’. Although more 
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complex plants may well have more developed capacities for integration 
compared with more simple plants, it is my view that the latter may also have 
a center of awareness coordinating the activities between their different parts. 
The possibility that a plant may survive splitting need not exclude the 
possibility that a controlling agent may be present with some awareness of the 
parts that constitute it and that it provides some unity to its different parts.4  
 The second assumption McDaniel makes is that a plant’s – or to 
be more precise, a plant cell’s – aim to survive is not as great as that of a 
porpoise’s, and he makes a more general distinction between plants and 
animals in this respect. However, some plants have remarkable regenerative 
powers.  Tomato growers, for example, know that tomato plants (or some of 
their parts) that have been severed from their roots can still regenerate. This 
suggests that plants may well have strong aims to survive. In spite of the fact 
that Whitehead (1978, p. 176) did not think that plants were individuals in the 
same sense as animals, he held the view that all actual entities have 
subjective aims, and he even appeared to acknowledge that plants aim at 
survival when he wrote that they ‘exhibit modes of behaviour towards self-
preservation’. If the ability to imagine future scenarios is considered to be a 
necessary condition for an organism to have an aim, it might be concluded 
that a plant does not have an aim in this sense of the word. Yet in that case, 
nonhuman (henceforth, ‘other’) animals might not have aims either, at least if 
what has been called the ‘Bischoff-Köhler hypothesis’ is accepted, or the 
hypothesis that other animals ‘are unable to anticipate future (motivational) 
states’ (Mendl & Paul, 2008, p. 370).5 On the other hand, if the word ‘aim’ is 
taken to be something much more basic, plants as well as animals could be 
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said to have aims. A plant could be said to aim at sunlight, and the human 
body could be said to aim at breathing, where neither requires conscious 
planning. So what is the difference between a plant’s aim and the aim of an 
animal? Perhaps it is just that animals have greater control over their aims, 
rather than greater aims (for example, at survival) as such. The different parts 
that compose animals are generally more specialised compared to the parts 
that compose plants, and greater ability is required to coordinate these parts. 
Therefore, animals may need greater awareness to fulfill their aims. Although 
McDaniel’s view that the ‘aim to survive’ is weaker in plants than in animals 
could be questioned, he may be right that plants are less concerned about or 
interested in ‘surviving with satisfaction’. This need not be taken to imply that 
other animals are aware of the fact that they are trying to survive. Rather, their 
interests in survival could be understood in terms of their abilities to 
experience sadness and joy (or satisfaction) associated with either the lack or 
the presence of suitable survival conditions.  
 McDaniel’s view that different organisms have different capacities 
to experience satisfaction is shared by many process philosophers. Although 
Whitehead (1933, p. 325) spoke of differences in intensities of feeling which 
he associated with ‘strength of beauty’, Charles Birch and John Cobb (1984, 
p. 145) have used the notion of different degrees of ‘richness of experience’, a 
concept borrowed from the biologist Waddington (1960, p. 204), who used it 
in a different context (namely, to express his belief that ‘the general 
anagenesis of evolution is towards … richness of experience’). Although little 
is said on how these capacities can be graded, these authors also agree that 
these differences are morally relevant. This enables me to respond to the first 
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question: These process philosophers think that, notwithstanding instrumental 
considerations, animals (or to be precise, all animals with relatively greater 
capacities for richness of experience) deserve more moral significance than 
plants, given that relative moral significance must be determined by relative 
strengths in capacities for richness of experience.  
 
Does preferring animals over plants require vegetarianism? 
Some readers may think that this has also provided the answer to the 
question of whether Whiteheadians should be vegetarians: If animals with 
capacities for rich experiences deserve more moral significance than plants, 
one might be tempted to think that consuming such animals must be 
prohibited, at least if the assumption is made that their consumption would be 
bound up inextricably with their being killed in order to be eaten.  
 This assumption, however, is flawed. Although it might be agreed 
that animals deserve more moral significance than plants and that animals 
therefore should not be killed intentionally, some may not object to the eating 
of animals who have been killed unintentionally, for example those who were 
killed accidentally by vehicles (those who are frequently referred to by the 
abstract name of ‘road kill’). Unlike the time in which Whitehead lived, when 
there was far less traffic on most roads in comparison to today, these traffic 
casualties might secure a steady supply of animal bodies for those animal 
eaters who lived or traveled in the ‘right’ places. The possibility that animal 
bodies might be available to those who consume them without the need to kill 
them for this purpose has received little attention from process thinkers, which 
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might stem from the correct assumption that, for most animal eaters, animals 
are, de facto, killed in order to be eaten, rather than victims of road accidents.  
 However, process thinkers have also developed arguments to 
justify the conclusion that the fact that animals should be given greater moral 
significance need not result in a moral commitment to minimal moral 
vegetarianism. This takes us to the second issue identified previously, the 
question of whether the attribution of greater moral significance to animals 
than to plants must result merely in a prima facie duty to refrain from inflicting 
pain on them or also in a prima facie duty not to kill them in order to eat them.  
 
How do Birch and Cobb justify the killing of certain animals for food? 
On this issue, Birch and Cobb take the most traditional view. In their co-
authored book with the title ‘The Liberation of Life’, Birch and Cobb (1984) 
endorse neither a prima facie duty to refrain from inflicting pain on animals nor 
a prima facie attribution of a right not to be eaten that would demand minimal 
moral vegetarianism. Their concern is primarily with making sure that the 
suffering endured by the animals humans eat is canceled out by the amount 
of pleasure animal products provide. Birch and Cobb (Birch & Cobb, 1984, p. 
156) agree with Jan Narveson’s (1977, p. 173) total utility version of hedonic 
utilitarianism, or the view that ‘raising animals for food can be justified if “the 
amount of pleasure which humans derive per pound of animal flesh exceeds 
the amount of discomfort and pain per pound which are inflicted on animals in 
the process”.’ If animals can be kept in good conditions as well as be killed 
without feeling too much pain, Birch and Cobb would not object to their being 
reared and killed for human consumption. Their view that this is morally 
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justified would seem to gather strength in a world wherein there is no shortage 
of gourmands claiming to derive a great deal of gustatory pleasures from 
eating animals.  
 This, however, is not the full story. Birch and Cobb also make the 
point that not all animals are appropriate candidates for human consumption. 
They distinguish between two categories of animals, choosing chickens to 
exemplify one, and choosing porpoises and chimpanzees to represent the 
other (Birch & Cobb, 1984, p. 159-160; Cobb, 2001, p. 117). Birch and Cobb 
(1984, p. 160) object to the killing of porpoises and chimpanzees for food 
because ‘there are indications of an individuality resembling our own and of 
social relations which lead to grieving for the dead’. This is contrasted with 
‘the chicken’s case’ where the ‘element of uniqueness’ would be ‘trivial’. They 
add that a chicken would not be ‘pervasively affected by the anticipation of its 
death’ and might suffer as much when she dies in old age as the amount she 
might suffer while undergoing a ‘violent death earlier in life’. Furthermore, they 
purport that a chicken’s death would not cause ‘grief’ in other chickens (Birch 
& Cobb, 1984, p. 159). These views are put forward to support their view that 
as long as chickens are killed without being made to suffer too much and are 
replaced by other chickens, no value would be lost, which would not be a 
good justification for the killing (for food) of a different category of animals, 
including chimpanzees and porpoises.  
 I have problems with this theory for a number of reasons. The 
crucial issue is that it is not clear why a distinction between two categories of 
other animals is made. One could argue that, provided animals such as 
chimpanzees and porpoises are killed relatively painlessly and replaced by 
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other animals with similar capacities for richness of experience, it is not clear 
why Birch and Cobb’s theory would object to their being killed. Birch and 
Cobb might object that this ignores the fact that these animals suffer in ways 
other animals do not because of their capacities to anticipate their own 
deaths. The counterargument is that this need not mean that killing these 
animals for food would necessarily be problematic (even when good food 
alternatives are available), provided that one has made sure that death is not 
anticipated and occurs suddenly. Moreover, it must be questioned whether 
other animals can anticipate their own deaths. If this refers to something like 
the (typical) human capacity to anticipate death, it would presuppose the 
existence of the ability to reflect on one’s own mortality. If what Warwick Fox 
(2006, p. 207-245) claims in a recent book is right, namely that no other 
animals possess this ability, a negative answer must be given.   
 Should Birch and Cobb agree that other animals may not be able 
to anticipate death, they might still argue that the distinction can be justified by 
the fact that only some animals are able to grieve over the deaths of other 
animals. Yet the view that this applies only to the narrow selection of species 
identified by Birch and Cobb has been contested by Dombrowski (1988, p. 
83), who provides a few examples (baboons, dogs, cows, pigs), including the 
example of ‘veal calves’ who would cause ‘nothing short of grief in the 
mothers’ after being separated from them. It must be asked, however, 
whether these feelings are adequately interpreted as instances of grieving. If 
the capacity to grieve presupposes the capacity to think about a situation in 
the past (‘my mother was present’) and to compare this with a situation in the 
present (‘my mother is not present’), it must be doubted whether other 
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animals can grieve. According to José Bermúdez (2003), non-linguistic 
organisms cannot have thoughts about thoughts (because thoughts must 
have linguistic vehicles to be the objects of further thoughts), and therefore 
would not be able to entertain thoughts about the past either. Bermúdez 
(2003, p. 180) argues that ‘thinking about temporal relations ... requires being 
able to think about the possibility of propositions being true or false at different 
times’, and therefore is inextricably linked with the ability of linguistic 
organisms to grasp the meaning of truth-functional operators. In other words, 
an organism must be able to grasp that a particular proposition can be true at 
one time (it has been the case that ‘my mother is present’) and false at 
another time (it is not the case that ‘my mother is present’).  If Bermúdez is 
right, focusing on the capacity to grieve would separate human animals from 
all other animals.  
 On the other hand, if we understand the capacity to grieve as a 
more general capacity to suffer the emotional pain that Dombrowski claims 
many other animals suffer after being separated from others, Birch and Cobb 
might be forced to enlarge the category to which chimpanzees and porpoises 
belong considerably. Research carried out with western scrub jays, for 
example, provides evidence for the view that these animals might be able to 
re-live experiences, thus possessing episodic memories (Clayton & Dickinson, 
1998). These birds were found to be able to use information about the 
locations and times at which they had cached different food types to make 
subsequent retrieval decisions. Although this does not establish that these 
jays have conscious memories of past experiences, so that they would be 
able to – in the words of Mendl and Paul (2008, p. 375) – ‘ruminate on past 
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events’, this need not exclude the possibility that, like western scrub jays, a 
wide range of other animals might be influenced by events that happened in 
the past both in their behavior and in their experience. Mendl and Paul (2008, 
p. 376) refer to research carried out with amnesic human patients which 
shows that, even in the absence of conscious memories, such patients 
manage to ‘discriminate appropriately between people with whom they have 
had staged positive or negative encounters’. On this basis, they write that, 
even if the assumption is made that other animals are unable ‘to travel 
mentally in time and recall the events episodically’ they might ‘still be capable 
of experiencing the emotional components of traumatic events’ (Mendl & Paul, 
2008, p. 375). If we understand grief in terms of a general feeling of sadness 
associated with a past event that involved an animal being separated from 
another animal, it can be concluded that Birch and Cobb might have been too 
restrictive in limiting the existence of these kinds of feelings to their narrow 
selection of animals.  
 A further question is why it would be morally wrong, at least prima 
facie, to kill for food those animals who may be able to grieve, in either the 
general sense or the more restrictive sense, whereas it would be fine to kill 
other animals for food, provided humans derive sufficient pleasure from eating 
them. Birch and Cobb do not provide an answer to this question separately or 
together in their joint work. Rather, they seek to ground the distinction 
between the two categories of animals also in the claim that only some 
animals are unique. This theme is repeated in one of Cobb’s (2004, p. 18) 
more recent writings, where he claims that humans are ‘much more fully 
individuated’ compared to deer. However, it is not clear why some animals, for 
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example chickens, should lack uniqueness. The word ‘unique’ is defined in 
the dictionary as ‘without a like’ and is derived from the Latin word ‘unus’, 
meaning ‘one’ (Schwarz et al., 1994). In view of this definition, it would seem 
to me to be clear that chickens are unities. It does not seem right to conceive 
of a chicken as being a part of a larger whole that one might call 
‘chickenhood’, or to say that the concept of ‘a chicken’ is in fact a plural noun 
for the different things that compose a chicken. Birch and Cobb might be 
tempted to conclude that chickens are not unique on the basis of the view that 
chickens might look very similar to one another to the untrained eye. 
However, although identical human twins also may look very similar to one 
another, it would be wrong to deny that they are unique individuals on the 
basis of the fact that they resemble one another. Likewise, I believe it would 
be wrong to deny chickens or deer individuality on the basis of the view that 
they look like species members. Although many human beings may find it 
difficult to observe differences between other animals and to imagine that they 
might have different characters, I do not think that this should be used to 
ground the view that animals are not individuals. The fact that animals can 
mobilise their body parts in a synchronised way to pursue particular objectives 
should provide us with sufficient evidence to conclude that they are 
individuals.6 
 Apart from the question of whether other animals are individuals, 
Birch and Cobb also seem to attach moral significance to whether an animal 
possesses ‘an individuality resembling our own’. This is confirmed elsewhere 
by Cobb (2001, p. 117), where he writes that whether an animal shows 
‘similarity to human beings’ matters morally, clarifying at the same time that 
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this is not ‘the only basis of valuing other species’. It is not clear what the 
nature of this similarity should be, and what other bases might be relevant. 
Regarding the nature of this similarity, we could, for example, distinguish 
between physiological and cognitive similarity. When we compare monkeys 
and dolphins, for example, the former may be more similar to humans 
physiologically, but the latter may be more similar cognitively. Cobb himself 
actually uses monkeys and dolphins as examples to make the point that 
species such as dolphins - whom he considers to be more dissimilar to 
humans - should not necessarily be less valuable. Therefore, a clearer 
articulation of the nature of morally relevant degrees of similarity and of the 
relative importance of similarity in relation to other values would have been a 
welcome addition to their account of animal ethics. For our present purposes, 
however, it is sufficient to conclude that Birch and Cobb fail to provide an 
answer to the question of why the killing for food of those animals who are 
more dissimilar (in all respects), yet not of those who are more similar to 
humans, should be regarded as acceptable in situations where humans do 
not need to engage in that killing.  
 One response to this problem would be to relocate animals similar 
to humans to the tier of animals who legitimately can be killed for food in most 
circumstances, so that only human animals remain in the other tier. Although 
this option is not favored by Birch and Cobb, someone who is inspired by their 
account and who is not convinced by the moral relevance of the capacity to 
grieve could nevertheless focus on the question of whether one’s death would 
cause grief in others, another issue that has gained Birch and Cobb’s 
attention. However, this attempt to use the importance that Birch and Cobb 
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appear to give to whether one’s death is grieved by others to ground a 
distinction between human and other animals is not without its problems 
either. One problem with this view is that not all human deaths are bemoaned 
by others. If the assumption is made that even humans whose deaths are not 
bewailed by others have a prima facie right not to be killed, the prima facie 
right not to be killed cannot be determined by whether one’s death would be 
grieved by others.7 Another problem is that humans can be affected 
negatively by the death of any animal, irrespective of whether the animal in 
question happens to be human. Those who keep companion animals, for 
example, may grieve the deaths of their companions. Therefore, someone 
who attaches moral significance to the question of whether one’s death would 
be grieved by others would be obliged to take on board not only humans but 
also some other animals. And if only loved animals would make it into the top 
tier, it must be asked whether this would be fair to animals who are not loved 
by humans or, for example, to companion animals whose owners die. In my 
view, it would fail to do them justice.  
 In conclusion, Birch and Cobb have failed to establish that there 
are two tiers of animals, where it would normally be acceptable to kill animals 
belonging to one tier, but not animals in the other tier. Although I agree with 
their view that animals’ ability to feel pain matters morally and that – to use 
Cobb’s own words – we should not ‘turn our backs upon their suffering with 
indifference’, I find the view that we should be justified to ‘turn our backs’ 
provided that the interests most other animals have are deemed to be 
outweighed by the pleasures humans derive from eating their bodies difficult 
to reconcile with any view that might plausibly be held by those whom Cobb 
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(1990, p. 271-272) has referred to as those ‘few brave souls’ who ‘talk about 
… animal rights’. 
 
McDaniel on vegetarianism 
Although Birch and Cobb provide a negative answer to the question of 
whether we should support minimal moral vegetarianism, a positive answer 
appears to be given by Jay McDaniel (1989, p. 71) who writes that ‘Christians 
in industrial societies whose lives do not depend on the eating of meat can 
and should choose vegetarianism’, at least if McDaniel regards this to be a 
moral duty also for those who are not Christians. However, because McDaniel 
(1989, p. 71) proceeds by relating his ‘boycott’ of the ‘meat industry’ to ‘the 
appalling conditions under which most animals are raised for food and 
transported to slaughter’, it must be asked whether he would support such a 
boycott if these ‘conditions’ were better than they in fact are. In other words, 
does McDaniel object to the killing of some animals for food only because of 
the ways in which animals are treated in the process or also because he 
believes that some animals have a prima facie right to life that should not be 
taken away from them by humans ‘whose lives’ do not ‘depend’ on consuming 
animals?  
 McDaniel appears to value both positions, at least with some 
qualification. Although he seems to be especially concerned with the well-
being of factory farmed animals who may have – in McDaniel’s (1989, p. 22, 
112) words – ‘almost no opportunities for quality existence’, he is also 
concerned with the killing of some animals, at least as long as ‘human 
survival’ does not depend on it: ‘in slaughtering certain animals we violate 
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their interests in surviving with some degree of satisfaction’. This statement, 
however, may not imply that he grants to all animals a prima facie right not to 
be killed for food, given that he applies the notion of ‘interests’ only to ‘animals 
with advanced nervous systems’ (McDaniel, 1989, p. 22). This claim raises 
many questions, not in the least how ‘advanced’ an animal’s nervous system 
should be, why the possession of such a nervous system should be important, 
and whether the notion of ‘interests’ could also be applied to animals who lack 
such nervous systems. These are issues to be explored in another article.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have shown that there is one paragraph in Whitehead’s work 
where he implies minimal moral vegetarianism, yet there is no evidence to 
suggest that Whitehead ever committed to adopting a vegetarian diet. I have 
also argued that Whiteheadian philosophers generally ground a moral 
distinction between plants and animals in Whitehead’s view that there are 
higher and lower grades of experience in nature. Although I question the view 
that plants are mere ‘democracies’, I embrace the view adopted by the 
Whiteheadian philosophers whose work I engaged with here that a morally 
relevant distinction must be made between plants and animals. In addressing 
whether the recognition of this distinction implies a prima facie duty merely to 
refrain from inflicting suffering on other animals or a duty to adopt minimal 
moral vegetarianism, I have explored the works of Birch, Cobb, and McDaniel 
on this issue. Because Birch and Cobb’s views are unconvincing and because 
McDaniel’s account leaves many questions unanswered, I shall engage 
critically with the works of other Whiteheadian philosophers who have 
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discussed the ethics of vegetarianism in an ensuing article in order to develop 
my own position on Whitehead’s minimal moral vegetarianism. 
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Notes 
 
1
 Another example is provided to illustrate the difference between 
‘democracies’ and ‘societies with regnant occasions’. When water molecules 
are poured into a glass, we can speak of a democracy or an aggregate: No 
higher organism is formed. The experiences of the collection of molecules 
coincide with the experiences of the different molecules. When water 
molecules are parts of a living cell, by contrast, they are part of a higher 
organism with its own experience that does not coincide with the experiences 
of the molecules that compose it. The cell as a whole has a regnant occasion 
that unifies and structures the subordinate occasions. It is not a democracy. 
The more widely used term for ‘society with a regnant occasion’ is 
Hartshorne’s (1972) notion of a ‘compound individual.’  
2
 Although I have no evidence to believe that Whitehead was a vegetarian at 
any stage of his life, I would be grateful to receive evidence that he might 
have been. 
3
 It must be emphasised that minimal moral vegetarianism is a moral position, 
rather than a label to describe what people eat. Although further work is 
needed to define what would qualify as ‘unacceptably high ecological or social 
costs’, I provide two examples here of what may and may not be considered 
‘unacceptably high’. If the Inuit living in polar regions, for example, made the 
claim that they must eat animals because the costs of importing alternative 
foods would be unacceptably high, this seems to me to be acceptable. If the 
English made the claim that the ecological or social costs of eating alternative 
foods would be unacceptably high, this does not seem to be acceptable. 
4
 Although the issue of whether plants have presiding occasions deserves 
more discussion than I can give to it here, I do not like to exclude the 
possibility that they might have them. Whatever may be the case, what Clare 
Palmer (1998, p. 89) claims in the context of discussing Whitehead’s views on 
the issue, namely that the fact ‘that cuttings can be taken from a plant in a 
way impossible with higher organisms demonstrates its lack of centralization’, 
is a non sequitur. 
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5
 I agree with Linzey (2009, p. 45) where he makes the point that the term 
‘nonhuman’ may not be appropriate to refer to other animals as it is rather odd 
that we refer to other animals by what they are not. Without qualification, 
however, the term ‘other animals’ is not without ambiguity. 
6
 Incidentally, Birch and Cobb’s inability to regard some animals as individuals 
illustrates a wider societal lack of empirical knowledge concerning the lives of 
other animals, which has been problematised by Ariel Tsovel (2006). Tsovel 
argues that the inability to perceive some degree of similarity between 
ourselves and chickens, which she considers to be necessary for the 
development of an empathic relationship, is hampered by the fact that virtually 
all people are deeply alienated from the lives of chickens. This is attributed to 
many things, including the division of labour, the propagation of fantastic 
images portraying the ‘reality’ of farming, and the use of scientific approaches 
to study the lives of other animals, which objectify and generalise from the 
lives of the individuals involved.  
7
 Elsewhere, Birch (1990, p. 65-66) expresses disagreement with the view 
that it would be appropriate to dispose of companion animals who are no 
longer wanted. 
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